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ABSTRACT
After incurring significant losses during France’s 2013 Operation Serval in Mali, Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is back. Mokhtar Belmokhtar has rejoined 
the group, violent attacks are on the increase, and southern Libya offers elements 
of the group a new safe-haven. This article takes a long view on AQIM, looking at 
its objectives and ideology, organizational structure, relationship with the local 
population and revenue model to determine whether they should be labelled 
as terrorists, insurgents, or ordinary criminals. The article concludes that AQIM 
generally follows a strategy of terrorism, while some elements and modus operandi 
could also be indicative of a strategy of insurgency. AQIM’s primary commanders 
have a long-standing relationship with the global Al Qaeda movement, are unlikely 
to be seduced by the Islamic State, and enjoy significant autonomy in conducting 
their operations. There is, however, little evidence that supports the view that 
AQIM is a criminal organization behind a religious façade, and its Salafi–jihadist 
ideology remains a leading determinant.
ARTICLE HISTORY received 16 February 2016; accepted 8 march 2016
KEYWORDS aQIm; terrorism; insurgency; mali; Sahel; intervention
Introduction
On 20 November 2015, two gunmen attacked the luxury Radisson Blu hotel in 
Bamako, Mali, killing 22 people before they were themselves shot by French and 
Malian Special Forces. The attack was initially claimed by Al Murabitoon, led by 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar (Khalid Abu Al Abbas), a union of two offshoots from Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Two weeks later, the ‘emir’ or commander 
of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel (Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud) announced that 
Al Murabitoon had joined AQIM and that the hotel attack was their first joint 
operation.1 Then on 15 January 2016, the Splendid hotel and Cappuccino Café in 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, were hit by a similar attack, killing 30 civilians and 
wounding more than 56. On the same day, militants attacked a police convoy 
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and kidnapped an elderly Australian couple in the north of the country. AQIM 
claimed responsibility for the hotel attack and the kidnapping.2 While these 
spectacular attacks garnered much international media attention, throughout 
2015 neighbouring Mali had already faced a resurgent AQIM. Suicide bomb-
ings, rocket attacks, and ambushes inflicted many casualties on local security 
forces and made the uN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINuMSA) one of the most dangerous uN missions ever, with some 60 
peacekeepers killed already.
AQIM is not the only armed group responsible for the violence in northern 
Mali. There is a plethora of armed factions including criminal enterprises, Tuareg 
separatists, government aligned militias, and several groups that espouse a 
Salafi–jihadist agenda. In 2012, an armed uprising was started by the ‘Mouvement 
national de libération de l’Azawad’ (MNLA), a Tuareg separatist faction, aided by 
three jihadist groups: AQIM, its offshoot ‘Mouvement pour l’unicité et le Jihad en 
Afrique de l’Ouest’ (MuJAO), and Ansar Dine. Once this coalition had forcefully 
evicted the Malian army and government administration from the north, what 
started as a secular rebellion was hijacked by the three Salafi–jihadist groups. 
They would govern the north until January 2013, when their sudden attack on 
the south provoked a French military intervention. upon request of the belea-
guered government in Bamako, France launched Operation Serval and liberated 
the north from the jihadists.3 Since July 2013 the uN has deployed MINuSMA, 
France has launched a new, regional counterterrorist mission called Operation 
Barkhane, and the Algiers peace process is attempting to reconcile Tuareg sep-
aratists with factions that are aligned with the Malian government and the gov-
ernment itself. While Operation Serval inflicted serious losses on the jihadist 
groups in 2013, and incidental raids conducted by Barkhane have killed high-
level terrorist commanders since, the groups are again becoming more active.4
This article will focus on AQIM as the main organization responsible for ter-
rorist attacks in the Sahel and as the ‘mother’ of several violent offshoots. These 
include MuJAO and Belmokhtar’s Al Murabitoon, which rejoined after a split 
lasting nearly two years. Ansar Dine and its leader, Iyad ag ghali (Shayk Abu Fadl), 
are closely allied to AQIM and are in turn well connected to the newly formed 
Macina Liberation Front.5 The exact relationship between the major jihadist 
groups remains difficult to discern, and the example of an important Malian 
jihadist, Oumar Ould Hamaha, illustrates how a commander can switch from 
AQIM to Ansar Dine and finally to MuJAO.6 It is no coincidence that Belmokhtar 
has recently rejoined forces with AQIM: both are fiercely loyal to Al Qaeda’s 
leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri and they are facing increasing competition from 
the Islamic State (IS). In the north, IS has established a firm foothold in Libya, 
and in the south, in Nigeria, Boko Haram has already pledged its allegiance to 
Al-Baghdadi. A spokesman for MuJAO announced the group’s allegiance to IS in 
May 2015, but this was quickly denied by other group members.7 The increase 
of violence in Mali and beyond, an uptake of media announcements by AQIM 
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commanders, and the budding competition with IS merits a new analysis of 
AQIM. Taking a long view of AQIM’s origins and actions, this article uses a con-
ceptual framework to analyse whether the organization should be categorized 
as an insurgency, terrorist group, or crime syndicate.
Labels, definitions, and concepts
AQIM has been the focus of significant academic scholarship, although many 
authors have confined their research to one article, frequently preferring a 
descriptive analytical approach to a conceptual or theoretical one. Mathieu 
guidère has published extensively on AQIM and was one of three experts 
consulted by the Associated Press to determine the authenticity of several Al 
Qaeda letters that were discovered in Timbuktu, Mali.8 Jean-Pierre Filiu, who is an 
Arabist like guidère, has equally written quality works on AQIM, rich in primacy 
sources, before broadening his scope to Al Qaeda in general and the Islamic 
State.9 Many authors have researched AQIM’s Algerian roots, its relationship 
with Al Qaeda, and the dichotomy between its focus on the ‘near’ or ‘far enemy’, 
with Jean-Luc Marret notably labelling AQIM a ‘glocal’ organization.10 Andrew 
Lebovich has recently published several works on AQIM and other related 
Sahel jihadist groups.11 Nonetheless, the existing body of literature on AQIM 
is – understandably – strongly embedded in the field of terrorism studies, with 
consequently neither an argued case for its terrorist label, nor a consideration 
of other classifications and their potential implications.
From a policy perspective, the decision to label an armed group as terrorists, 
insurgents, or criminals is an important one. Terrorism is a politically loaded term 
and is dependent on the subjective opinion of the observer, illustrated by the 
adage that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Framing a group 
as terrorists effectively delegitimizes them, while simultaneously justifying a 
policy of violence in response. As Philip Herbst argues, ‘[c]onveying criminality, 
illegitimacy, and even madness, the application of the term terrorist shuts the 
door to discussion about the stigmatized group or with them, while reinforcing 
the righteousness of the labellers, justifying their agenda’s and mobilising their 
responses’.12 Conversely, labelling a group as ordinary criminals (notwithstand-
ing that terrorism is also illegal), belittles the underlying grievances, ideologies, 
and motivations, attributing their actions to solely personal, often material gain. 
In all cases, the designated label channels a policy reaction that is anchored in 
the very different fields of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency (COIN), or law 
enforcement, each centred around its own principles, dogmas, and common 
practices.
AQIM has been designated a terrorist group by the united Nations Security 
Council, the united States, and the european union. Nonetheless, reaching con-
sensus on the definition of terrorism has proven to be extremely difficult; neither 
academia nor the uN can agree on such a value-laden and subjective term. 
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Avoiding the debate on definitions, this article will use the revised academic 
definition of terrorism as formulated by Alex Schmid:
Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness 
of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on 
the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct 
violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and 
non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on 
various audiences and conflict parties.13
The concept insurgency has provoked less debate, with general recognition 
that it is a strategy (not a tactic) to achieve political and military control over a 
population and territory. Traditionally insurgencies have consisted of irregular 
movements that have sought to mobilize a part of the population to assist in 
overthrowing the governing authorities.14 Nonetheless, distinguishing between 
terrorists and insurgents remains fraught with difficulty, as they often share the 
same modus operandi.
According to Duyvesteyn and Fumerton, it is essential to regard terrorism and 
insurgency as two distinct strategies of irregular war.15 The fundamental differ-
ences can be divided into three categories. First, the political objectives differ. 
Terrorism aims to provoke a response through violence to attain a political effect. 
Insurgents, conversely, intend to force political change through political and 
military control of a territory and its population. Secondly, the organizational 
structures differ as a result of the diverging objectives. Terrorists generally act 
in small and secret conspiracies, while insurgencies need a large and relatively 
open shadow state structure. Finally, for organizations following a terrorist strat-
egy, active involvement of the population is not critical for success, although 
public support can shape and constrain both the actions of terrorists and the 
governments that counter them.16 Conversely, for an insurgency, control of or 
support from the population is essential for strategic success.
This article will use Duyvesteyn and Fumerton’s three categories to examine 
AQIM and add a fourth element: the financial revenue model. By their very 
nature, illegal organizations like terrorist or insurgent groups will revert to illegal 
activities to fund their operations. It is important to investigate whether these 
fundraising activities present an intrinsic clash with the group’s professed ide-
ology. For example, drugs are officially haram (forbidden or sinful) in Islam, and 
even smoking and alcohol were banned when the jihadists governed northern 
Mali. If they subsequently traffic these goods, it could imply that material gain 
trumps religious or ideological motives, moving the classification of the organ-
ization into the domain of organized crime. When the gap between preaching 
and practice is sufficiently large, this can be exploited to undermine the group’s 
legitimacy and credibility.
This distinction between terrorism and insurgency, and even the relevance 
and usefulness of the exercise, is not without controversy. James Khalil, noting 
that academic research is stove-piped into these two categories with parallel 
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literatures sharing few insights and sources, argues that it is impossible to arbi-
trarily impose binary distinctions upon continuous variables such as popula-
tion support and control of territory.17 David Kilcullen and John Mackinlay have 
argued that Al Qaeda should be seen as a global insurgency that uses terrorist 
tactics, since the global jihad has the objective of reinstating the Caliphate and 
replacing apostate local regimes.18 Conceptual confusion is compounded by the 
complexities of the Sahel. In Mali alone, there are a more than a dozen armed 
groups, including separatists, militias, and jihadi groups. They have different 
objectives and oscillate between competition and cooperation, with fighters 
frequently switching groups. ‘Last year alone’, a Tuareg explained to Peter Tinti 
in 2014, ‘there are people who have changed from Malian military, to separatist 
rebel, to jihadist, to French ally, all while being narco-traffickers.’19
AQIM’s historical roots
The origins of AQIM lie in the crucible of the Algerian civil war. Its current gen-
eration of commanders, including the emir Droukdel and commanders such as 
Belmokhtar and Djamel Okacha all hark back to the original insurgency against 
the Algerian government. In 1992 a broad Islamist movement was robbed of 
an impending electoral victory by a military coup that cancelled the elections. 
Algeria immediately descended into violence that only abated at the end of 
the decade, costing an estimated 200,000 lives. ‘Afghan Algerians’, the so-called 
foreign fighters who had returned from ‘jihad’ or training camps in Afghanistan, 
played a central role in the conflict. These trained combatants, many of whom 
had developed personal bonds with the future Al Qaeda leadership and had 
been infused with its ideology, formed the nucleus of the ‘groupe Islamique 
Armé’ (gIA). The gIA was initially only one of many groups fighting the gov-
ernment, but by 1994 had become the predominant and most violent faction. 
Based on Salafi–jihadist ideology, it had a particularly uncompromising stance, 
symbolized by its motto: no agreement, no truce, no dialogue.20 Those that the 
group labelled takfir (enemies of Islam), were classified as legitimate targets and 
therefore deserved to be killed, even if they were Muslim elderly, women, or chil-
dren. Several notorious fatwas by the preacher Abu Qatada in the Salafist weekly 
bulletin Al Ansar (the ‘Partisan’), printed in London, justified gIA massacres. 21
The gIA specifically targeted foreigners; first in Algeria and later in France. In 
December 1994 the gIA hijacked Air France 8969 from Algiers to Paris. France 
was the former colonial oppressor, and it was hated for its support of the military 
regime in Algiers. The hijackers probably intended to fly the plane into the eiffel 
Tower but were diverted to Marseille to refuel, where the plane was stormed by 
elite French police. In 1995 eight bombs exploded in the Paris underground, and 
a year later, seven Tibherine monks were abducted and beheaded in Algeria, 
horrifying the French public. These actions contributed to continued interna-
tional support for the military regime in its fight against the Islamists, and a 
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soft stance on the mass torture and extrajudicial executions that had become 
institutionalized as part of its counterterrorism policy.22 There is a strong body 
of evidence, including testimonies from military defectors, indicating that the 
security service, the Département du Renseignement et de la Securité (DRS), 
infiltrated and manipulated the gIA. Agents provocateurs fostered infighting 
and purges, and its wanton violence undermined the credibility of the gen-
eral Islamic opposition among locals and the international community. even 
investigations into the Air France hijacking and Tibherine murders point to a 
duplicitous role of the DRS.23
The turning point occurred in early 1998, when hundreds of civilians were 
massacred in the villages of Rais, Benthalla, and others. Here, too, were worrying 
signs of military units aiding and abetting mass murder.24 The magazine Al Ansar 
distanced itself from the gIA, and a large faction split off, founding the ‘groupe 
Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat’ (gSPC), vowing only to hit government 
targets. The last remnants of the gIA used the government’s reconciliation pro-
gramme to defect or were hunted down by the Algerian military. Bin Laden and 
the newly formed Al Qaeda supported the creation of the gSPC and its Afghan 
Algerians.25 While the new group firmly aligned itself with the Salafi–jihadist Al 
Qaeda ideology, in its first communiqué in September 1998 the group emphasized 
its objective of toppling the Algerian regime, but in no way mentioned any foreign 
enemy.26 On 11 September 2003, the gSPC’s emir pledged allegiance to Bin Laden 
and Mullah Omar in a communiqué.27 On 11 September 2006, exactly five years 
after 9/11, Al Qaeda leader Al-Zawahiri announced that the gSPC had joined Al 
Qaeda and urged them to become ‘a bone in the throat of the American and 
French crusaders’.28 On 26 January 2007 the gSPC, led by Droukdel, announced 
that it had rebranded itself ‘Al Qaeda in the land of the Islamic Maghreb’.
In the mid-2000s, many gSPC/AQIM fighters travelled to Iraq to join the fight 
against the ‘American occupier’. Al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), 
and Droukdel formed a close relationship, releasing propaganda statements in 
each other’s support.29 AQIM adopted several modus operandi of Al Qaeda in 
Iraq, such as suicide bombings which had hardly been used by the gIA during 
the Algerian civil war. The ability to hit hardened targets such as uN facilities and 
well-protected military installations has since been an enduring AQIM capability. 
Although AQIM was inspired by Al-Zarqawi and copied some of his tactics, Abu 
Yahya al-Libi, a high-ranking Al Qaeda official, used the example of the gIA to 
warn Al-Zarqawi that his brutality and wanton cruelty would alienate the local 
population and lead to his demise.30 Al-Zarqawi ignored the warning, lost popu-
lar support, and was killed, but AQIM commanders had learned the lesson well.
Objectives and ideology
A terrorist strategy aims at political change, without necessarily controlling the 
population. Violence serves as ‘propaganda by the deed’ and aims to influence a 
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target audience psychologically. Terrorists want to provoke a response, and it is 
this response – and not their actions – that fulfils their goals. For an insurgency, 
the political end goal is to establish some manner of governance of the popu-
lation. An example is the MNLA which launched the uprising in Mali in January 
2012 to establish the independent state of Azawad, but saw their rebellion 
hijacked by AQIM, MuJAO, and Ansar Dine.
The main driver of Al Qaeda’s strategy is its Salafi–jihadist ideology. In a rare 
and extensive 2008 interview with the New York Times, Droukdel laid out AQIM’s 
objectives, ideology, and achievements and explained the rationale behind its 
attacks. The first question asked was why he had joined Al Qaeda, and he replied 
that is was essential to join forces in the face of the ‘unified oppressors’ that were 
fermenting division among Muslim lands, stealing their riches, and corrupting 
their populations. As for AQIM’s goals, Droukdel added:
Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother, and you know 
them. As far as our goals concerning the Islamic Maghreb, they are plenty. But 
most importantly is to rescue our countries from the tentacles of these criminal 
regimes that betrayed their religion, and their people.31
In the interview, Droukdel reiterated the Al Qaeda policy of not recognizing 
country borders: ‘We are one nation with one religion and one language. Our 
history is the same but our land is divided, torn apart into states by colonialism.’ 
In comparison to the propaganda of the Islamic State, one word was conspic-
uously absent during the interview: the Caliphate. For Al Qaeda, the establish-
ment of a Caliphate is but a distant objective, one that must not be hastened.32
essential to Al Qaeda’s ideology are the teachings of the egyptian Sayyid 
Qutb, notably his book Milestones (1964), and the concepts of ‘far enemy’ and 
‘near enemy’.33 Jihad is considered a personal obligation and a violent struggle 
against the apostate regimes in Muslim countries (the ‘near enemy’) and against 
the united States and the West (the ‘far enemy’). The dilemma of which to focus 
on has been central to Al Qaeda and AQIM in the past decade, and priorities 
have changed over time. In Al-Zawahiri’s recent speeches, but also in Droukdel’s 
2008 interview, the emphasis lies on the near enemy.
government installations and the military – the near enemy – have been 
repeatedly struck by AQIM, although attacks are frequently underreported by 
Western media. In June 2005 the remote army base Lemgheity in the Mauritanian 
desert was attacked by Belmokhtar’s unit, killing 17 soldiers.34 Since then AQIM 
has conducted dozens of ambushes, killing scores of soldiers and police officers 
in Algeria, Tunisia, and Mali. The issue of killing civilians remains a sensitive one, 
eliciting debate after the multiple suicide bombings in Algiers in 2007. In the 
New York Times interview Droukdel reaffirmed that AQIM specifically aimed to 
strike at official government targets and Western interests, and that considerable 
effort went into avoiding Muslim casualties, but that some inevitable ‘collateral 
damage’ should not detract from an attack’s success. The 2015 hotel attacks in 
Bamako and Ouagadougou were specifically aimed at locations popular with 
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foreigners, and the purported separation of Muslims from non-Muslims in the 
Bamako hotel was reminiscent of Belmokhtar’s 2013 attack on the In Amenas gas 
plant, where locals were also separated from foreign employees and spared.35 
The specific targeting of government and security forces, and the purported 
care to avoid civilian casualties, is a common feature of insurgencies and guer-
rilla campaigns.
AQIM has threatened the ‘far enemy’ in countless audio and video messages. 
While it has attacked Western interests in the Sahel on many occasions, it has 
not managed to successfully launch an attack on the european mainland, 
unlike for instance Al Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP), responsible for 
the Charlie Hebdo attack (Paris, January 2015) or IS (Paris, November 2015). This 
is not for want of trying, and according to French intelligence several attacks 
in France have been prevented.36 The hatred against France has remained a 
constant factor since the gIA attacks, and Droukdel, Belmokhtar, and Iyad ag 
ghali have all specifically mentioned France as a primary target in their many 
media announcements. The 2007 killing of French tourists in Mauritania, fre-
quent hostage takings, and specific threats have frightened away tourists and 
even forced the Paris–Dakar race to move to South America. AQIM, however, has 
not inherited the extensive gIA network that was active in London, Brussels, and 
Paris in the mid-nineties, nor managed to mobilize elements within the large 
Maghreb diaspora in France. In general, AQIM’s continuous targeting of security 
forces and the purported attempts to avoid civilian casualties have recently been 
overshadowed by the hotel attacks, strongly indicating a strategy of terrorism.
Organizational structure and recruitment
The different strategies of terrorism and insurgency result in divergent organi-
zational structures and recruitment efforts. For insurgents, whose aim is to ulti-
mately control a population, some sort of shadow governance structure, with 
formal lines of hierarchy, is necessary. In parallel, the objective of building up 
a military force to oust the authorities requires a substantial recruitment effort 
among the local population. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for instance, clearly 
display both these elements. groups following a terrorist strategy, conversely, do 
not need to mobilize the masses, but use small, secretive groups to terrorize and 
intimidate. They tend to exhibit selective and small-scale recruitment as a result 
of the secretive nature they must adopt to avoid state counterterrorist efforts.
The organizational structure of Al Qaeda has changed considerably over the 
years, and its secretive nature makes it hard to analyse. under pressure from 
uS drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas, Al Qaeda has evolved from a centrally 
directed organization into a worldwide ‘franchiser’ of terrorist attacks. Some 
consider it more a ‘network organization’ or a ‘movement’ than a classical organ-
ization.37 The Abbottabad letters, consisting of (only) 17 declassified letters from 
a treasure trove of documents captured during the Bin Laden raid in May 2011, 
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offer a relatively recent insight into organizational issues. While probably not 
representative, the letters suggest that AQIM was not as important to Al Qaeda 
central as the other affiliates. AQIM appeared to have a significant degree of 
autonomy and generally followed advice given by the strategic leadership.38 
On the other hand, letters found in Timbuktu in 2013 offer the AQIM point of 
view. In a letter from Droukdel to his commanders, he mentions that on several 
occasions he had sought advice from Al Qaeda central, but not received any 
guidance back.39 Aware of the risks of phone or email interception and localiza-
tion long before the Snowden revelations, Al Qaeda’s strategic leadership had to 
communicate by letter. Internal communication remains a challenge for AQIM, 
hampering operationalization of the chosen strategy.
AQIM has adapted and adjusted the gSPC’s organizational structure, which in 
turn was largely based on the gIA. During the height of the Algerian insurgency, 
the gIA consisted of a nebulous network of armed factions headed by emirs, 
nominally united by the central leadership, but often autonomous in practice.40 
The gIA had divided Algeria into nine zones, a practice that was continued by 
the gSPC. Over the past decade, more combat and terrorist operations have 
shifted from northern Algeria to the large southern expanses of the Sahara, 
Belmokhtar’s fiefdom. Now operations have been divided into two sectors, 
a central emirate for northern Algeria and Tunisia, and a Sahara emirate for 
northern Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Libya led by Djamel Okacha (Yahia Abu el 
Hamam).41 The central leadership consists of a 14-member Shura council, pre-
sided over by emir Droukdel and including regional commanders and the heads 
of the political, military, judicial, and media committees.42 The current AQIM 
strategic leadership is based in the mountainous region of Kabylie to the east 
of Algiers, where the ethnic Berber population is engaged in an ancient struggle 
with the central government for more autonomy.43 AQIM’s basic fighting unit is 
formed by a katiba (also spelled ‘katibat’ or ‘katibah’), the Arabic word for phalanx 
or battalion, which was widely used during the Algerian war of independence 
(1954–1962). There is no standard number of fighters per katiba, and its size can 
vary from two dozen combatants to several hundred.
The limits of AQIM’s organizational structure were laid bare during the second 
half of 2012, when together with Ansar Dine and MuJAO it controlled north-
ern Mali. The expulsion of the Malian army and the conquest of the north was 
initiated by the Tuareg MNLA, but the alliance of convenience with the jihad-
ist groups quickly broke down. MNLA fighters were violently evicted by the 
jihadist groups or switched sides. The MNLA had become unpopular through 
widespread pillage and instances of rape in the towns they occupied, were not 
supported by the non-Tuareg majority, and lacked the finances of the jihadists.44 
Nonetheless, an elaborately written instruction by Droukdel to his lieutenants 
indicates that conflict with the MNLA was not desired.45 According to the letter, 
the decision to go to war with the MNLA, ‘after becoming close and almost 
completing a deal with them. . . . was a major mistake’. The local commanders 
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were chastised in the letter and reminded that the strategic leadership had still 
not received clarification on the turn of events.46
The problem of command and control – or recalcitrant commanders – led to 
a second strategic mistake, with disastrous consequences for their Islamic state 
project. Droukdel, ever mindful of the threat of a military intervention, explicitly 
instructed his commanders to refrain from provoking the international commu-
nity, even to the point that it was ‘better for you to be silent and pretend to be a 
domestic movement that has its own causes and concerns. There is no call for you 
to show that we have an expansionary, jihadi, Qaida or any other sort of project.’ 
The order not to provoke was ignored by Ansar Dine, who launched the January 
2013 attack on southern Mali, eliciting the immediate and overwhelming French 
military response. Belmokhtar was another difficult commander, and he was 
sharply criticized in an extensive 30-point letter from Droukdel for always doing 
things his own way.47 The criticism ranged from agreeing to an ‘absurdly’ low 
ransom for hostage Robert Fowler (€700,000) to contacting Al-Zawahiri directly 
and failing to organize large attacks. This and Belmokhtar’s personal rivalry with 
Abu Zeid, another important commander in the Sahara, undoubtedly contrib-
uted to him leaving AQIM in December 2012. Days after Operation Serval was 
launched, his new group called Katibat al-Mulathameen (The Masked Brigade) 
attacked the Algerian In Amenas gas installation, with Belmokhtar subsequently 
brazenly claiming he had acted on behalf of Al Qaeda.
AQIM’s recruitment efforts have known significant ups and downs during 
the past decade. Diplomat Robert Fowler offers a candid account of life as an 
Al Qaeda hostage and describes the background of the fighters in Belmokhtar’s 
katiba.48 The jihadists had varied ethic and social backgrounds, with the unit 
comprising fighters from all over the Sahel. The mainstay of the leadership 
cadre was Algerian, with ‘sub-Saharan Africans clearly second class in the eyes 
of AQIM’.49 According to analysts, this is one of the reasons that MuJAO split 
away, recruiting more within Songhai and other black African communities.50 
Fowler also noted that many of the warriors were extremely young, some even 
pre-adolescent. Several years later, during the jihadists’ 2012 control of northern 
Mali, hundreds of child soldiers were recruited.51 As the governing authority, the 
jihadists could recruit and press-gang children into service without impediment. 
The so-called Islamic state of Azawad also attracted many foreign fighters from 
all over Africa, but in contrast to Syria, only a handful from europe. The three 
jihadist groups grew at such a rate, setting up training camps in the north, that 
according to a French intelligence official, if France had waited much longer 
with Operational Serval it might not have had the capacity to tackle the groups 
on its own.52
The French intervention caused significant losses among the jihadists, killing 
around 700, taking 430 prisoners, and destroying some 200 tons of arms and 
ammunition.53 under pressure, AQIM urged especially Tunisians not to travel to 
Syria but join the fight in the Maghreb: ‘The front of the Islamic Maghreb today 
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is in desperate need of the support of the sons of Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and 
Mauritania to repel the French crusade.’54 This was to no avail, as the conflict 
in Syria is a much bigger magnet for Tunisian Salafi–jihadists than AQIM, with 
now probably at least 5000 Tunisians fighting there.55 This is significantly more 
than AQIM’s current total strength. Only AQIM’s small ‘uqba bin Nafi’ katiba reg-
ularly attacks security forces in southern Tunisia.56 Nonetheless, three years after 
Serval, AQIM is again recruiting successfully in northern Mali and beyond. By 
providing information that can be used to target MINuSMA convoys, a local in 
Mali can earn around €750. In a country where the minimum wage is less than 
€50 a month, the temptation to work for or with AQIM can be considerable.57 
AQIM’s organizational structure and recruitment efforts transformed consid-
erably during the phase that it controlled northern Mali, and reverted to the 
status quo ante after Operation Serval. This would not only indicate that AQIM 
follows a terrorist strategy, but also seems to validate this criterion to distinguish 
between a terrorist strategy and an insurgent one.
Relationship with the population
According to Duyvesteyn and Fumerton, groups with an insurgent strategy have 
a fundamentally different interaction with the local population than those with 
a terrorist strategy. The French pioneer in counterinsurgency doctrine, David 
galula, argues that for an insurgency the ‘exercise of political power depends on 
the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissive-
ness’.58 Population support, either winning the ‘heart and minds’ or instigating 
a system of collective oppression, are therefore vital to an insurgency. Terrorist 
groups, in part due to their secretive nature, are often alienated and isolated 
from the broader population. By following a terrorist strategy, through violence 
aimed at civilians, they actually risk being considered an enemy of the people 
rather than of the government.59 To characterize the different levels of interac-
tion with the local population, this section will use three levels of freedom that 
a group has in a certain territory. These are freedom of movement, freedom 
from interdiction (or safe-haven/sanctuary), and finally freedom to control the 
population. The last level indicates that an insurgency has achieved its objective.
Concerning freedom of movement, survival in the vast and arid plains of 
the Sahara is not an individual or group challenge, but a social and cultural 
undertaking. Many nomads and drivers habitually traverse the desert, and cor-
dial relations with ‘locals’ are a required minimum to allow for an undisturbed 
travel or presence. The desert is literally dotted with caches of reserve petrol 
supplies, water reservoirs, car tyres, or other spare materials, left by transporters 
as a back-up in case of vehicle breakdowns or emergencies. The locals know the 
owner of each cache, and it is customary practice not to use anyone else’s cache 
unless in an emergency, under the strict condition of replenishing the goods 
as quickly as possible.60 AQIM thus has its own caches distributed throughout 
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the huge Sahel area, acknowledged and left untouched by others, just as AQIM 
respects other caches. AQIM units equally expend a considerable effort in keep-
ing good relations with any locals that are encountered during their travels.61 
Marriage is another effective method of integrating into local communities, and 
Belmokhtar married into a noble Berabish tribe near Timbuktu, ensuring good 
relations with powerful tribes.62 Coexistence with locals was the preferred strat-
egy of AQIM’s mobile katibas, enabling them to frequently change camps to foil 
intelligence services that attempted to locate them. Travelling large distances, 
their modus operandi resemble the traditional nomadic rezzou, swift and brutal 
raids to destroy the enemy. AQIM’s current freedom of movement stretches from 
Mauritania to Niger, and southern Algeria to Burkina Faso.
Sanctuaries offer reprieve from government pursuit and allow for recovery 
and replenishment after sustaining losses. The whole of northern Mali was effec-
tively a safe-haven for AQIM up until 2013. Within this vast area, they developed 
a mountainous redoubt in the Ametetai valley, an area of about 25 square kilo-
metres full of caves, crevices, and valleys in the Ardar des Ifoghas. AQIM chose 
it because it was the only location that provided natural water sources, and 
it frequently held its hostages there.63 The valleys were fortified by defensive 
positions, including heavy machinegun and mortar positions. During Operation 
Serval it was methodically cleared by elite French and Chadian troops, killing 
Abu Zeid and decimating his katiba. Now surveilled by drones and continuously 
at risk of a sudden air strike, it no longer offers a safe-haven. Libya has become 
the new sanctuary. Already during the last months of gadhafi’s reign in 2011, 
AQIM dispatched teams to establish jihadist cells in the southern regions. These 
have grown in importance since, and Libya’s south-west has been termed a 
‘vipers nest’ for terrorists by the French Defence Minister Le Drian.64
When AQIM governed parts of north Mali, from summer 2012 until Operation 
Serval, its relationship with the local population changed from mutual acquies-
cence to control. In a May 2012 audio message, Droukdel emphasized the need 
to gradually impose Sharia. He affirmed that it would be an error to impose all 
the rules of Islam in one go, but that ‘places of drugs, alcohol and immorality 
had to be closed immediately’. He also called for his AQIM ‘brothers’ to ensure 
security in towns under their control, and that essential services such as health 
care, water, and electricity had to be provided.65 The Timbuktu letters, probably 
dating from July, reinforce his earlier message and suggest making concessions 
with the enemy or locals. This was vital to avoid divisions between the groups 
and in society, as ‘[t]he aim of building these bridges is to make it clear that our 
Mujehadin are no longer isolated in society, and to integrate with the differ-
ent factions, including the big tribes and the main rebel movement and tribal 
chiefs.’66 This illustrates the difficulty of transitioning from a terrorist strategy to 
an insurgent one. The letter stresses prudence and moderation, comparing the 
Islamic project in Azawad to a small baby that must be nurtured and helped to 
stand on its own two feet (in a particularly hostile environment).
926  S. BOeKe 
Droukdel was adamant that the implementation of the Sharia must not be 
hastened. gradual evolution had to be applied in an environment that was 
ignorant of religion. ‘And our previous experience proved that applying Shariah 
this way, without taking the environment into consideration will lead to people 
rejecting the religion, and engender hatred toward the Mujehadin, and will con-
sequently lead to the failure of our experiment.’67 By criminalizing alcohol, smok-
ing, and the music and dance so central to local culture, and meting out harsh 
hudud punishments, the jihadists alienated large parts of the population. The 
deeply unpopular destruction of the shrines in Timbuktu, carried out by Ansar 
Dine, was equally criticized by Droukdel in his letter. In 2013 Operation Serval 
proved him right, and the French were welcomed as liberators by a euphoric 
population.68
Since Operation Serval, AQIM has reverted to a more distant relationship 
with the locals. There is widespread insecurity, caused in part by the slow Algiers 
peace process and inter-ethnic violence, and disillusionment with the govern-
ment’s lack of reform. In some areas in the north, there is apparently even less 
electricity than during the time the jihadists were in control, provoking nostalgia 
among some for the occupation by AQIM.69 In November 2015, 50 masked AQIM 
fighters, arriving in a dozen pick-up trucks, disrupted two different intercom-
munal meetings in the Timbuktu region. They read out a letter encouraging 
reconciliation between communities, threatened those that collaborated with 
the ‘enemies of Islam’, and promised to act against rural criminality. Before they 
left, the fighters distributed uSB sticks containing copies of the letter, the Quran, 
and a video that featured the beheading of a collaborator.70
AQIM’s relationship with the population has thus changed significantly over 
time and differs considerably in the areas where it operates. In the broader Sahel, 
AQIM has extensive freedom of movement and is relatively isolated from the 
population, although it does respect local customs in the large desert regions. 
This points to a strategy of terrorism, but is offset for example by current AQIM 
intimidation in the Timbuktu area. Here the AQIM katiba seeks to control the 
population, threatening collaborators and offering to provide security from 
petty crime. This deviates from the concept of secretive, alienated terrorist 
groups and illustrates the difficulty of conceptualizing AQIM’s modus operandi 
in rigid frameworks.
Criminal revenues as a goal or a means
In the fight against terrorism, violent non-state actors are often accused of 
involvement in organized crime and the drug trade. This is certainly the case 
for AQIM, with many governments and analysts arguing that its radical Islamist 
rhetoric merely serves as a cover for the group’s profitable criminal activities.71 
Some of the policy implications of this conclusion are clear: a stronger inter-
national effort is needed to disrupt illicit trafficking in West Africa, to ‘hit AQIM 
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where it hurts’ and deprive it of much needed funds.72 Mindful of the lack of 
reliable primary sources concerning AQIM’s financial income, this section will 
investigate AQIM’s three main revenue generating activities: smuggling, the 
drug trade, and kidnapping for ransom.
Northern Mali has traditionally been an international crossroads for trade 
and commerce, and smuggling has always formed a large part of local liveli-
hood. The northern city of Kidal is almost completely dependent on goods that 
come from Algeria, and the price differences of subsidized goods are readily 
exploited by smugglers. A matrix of networks that traditionally transports licit 
goods, such as petrol, tobacco, and foodstuffs, has diversified into illicit goods 
such as weapons, narcotics, and human-trafficking. According to Judith Scheele, 
the official distinction between legal and illegal trans-border trade is largely 
meaningless and has been replaced by what locals deem morally acceptable 
and what is not.73 Most of the economy is informal and thus difficult to quantify, 
but cigarette smuggling has always constituted a large share of the contraband. 
This is where Mokhtar Belmokhtar would have earned his notorious moniker ‘Mr 
Marlboro’. The accuracy of his reputation, however, is disputed by Mauritanian 
journalist Lemine Ould Salem, who has interviewed several government officials 
and traffickers in the region. These are all adamant that Belmokhtar was never a 
member of the cigarette smuggling networks. Instead he frequently frustrated 
their business by intercepting contraband convoys, burning cargos of cigarettes 
after sternly lecturing that they were ‘haram’.74
The drug trade has an enormous impact on the region. It took off around 
2004 as european port and airport controls were tightened and South American 
cartels discovered the soft underbelly of West Africa. For cocaine, the most 
important route has become ‘Highway 10’, named after the 10th parallel across 
the Atlantic Ocean. The drugs are brought in by plane or by boat, pass through 
failing states like guinea-Bissau and then transit north through Mali.75 The drugs 
are transported not by a single organization, but by a complex web of networks, 
each forming a small link in the supply chain that stretches from the Andes 
to europe.76 There is little empirical evidence to support allegations of direct 
AQIM involvement in drug smuggling, but it is plausible to assume that it has 
on occasion, like many other groups in northern Mali, imposed transit fees or 
provided security escorts.77 Many reports credit MuJAO with a larger role in the 
drug trade, and the city of gao, as their primary base and recruiting ground, is 
an important hub on the cocaine route.78
More important, however, is the role that the government of Mali has played 
in allowing the drug trade to flourish. During President Amadou Toumani Toure’s 
rule (2001–2012), Mali’s political and security structures had become deeply 
enmeshed in narco-trafficking, corrupting the state to the highest level. The 
state lost its legitimacy with the population, social relations within communi-
ties – especially between elders and the young – were disrupted, and fraught 
relations between ethnic groups were further exacerbated. The narco-networks 
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embedded themselves so deeply in society that little changed during the jihad-
ists’ occupation of the north, and even Operation Serval has not fundamentally 
affected the trade.79
Kidnapping for ransom is the main source of revenue for AQIM. In early 2003, 
32 european tourists were abducted by the gSPC in the Algerian Sahara. Half 
were freed during an Algerian military operation, while the last group ended up 
in northern Mali and was reportedly released for a total ransom of €5 million. A 
precedent was set for terrorist groups to kidnap Westerners for ransom. Since 
2003, nearly all of the around 60 hostages have been released, with the nota-
ble exceptions of edwin Dyer and Michel germaneau, who were executed in 
2009 and 2010, and Antoine De Leocour and Vincent Delory, who died during a 
failed rescue attempt by French special forces in 2011. The ransoms have been 
subject to considerable inflation with €5 million to €10 million per hostage now 
the reported going rate. According to an investigation by the New York Times, 
at least $91.5 million had been paid to AQIM (and presumably to its partner in 
crime, MuJAO) between 2008 and 2014.80 This has led to a vicious cycle where 
each release provides the incentive for another hostage-taking.
For AQIM, hostage-taking remains a means to an end. Belmokhtar initially 
challenged the practice of hostage-taking and requested arbitration from 
AQIM’s legal committee, considering it not part of jihad as the hostages were 
generally non-combatants and civilians. He also feared that the practice would 
attract unwanted attention from Western security services. AQIM’s legal commit-
tee ruled that all actions aimed to defend or extend Islam were legitimate jihad 
actions (subject to ‘the Law of War in Islam’), and that Western citizens were to be 
regarded as combatants, as they had democratically elected governments that 
supported ‘the War on Terror’.81 After this decision, Belmokhtar also reverted to 
the practice, kidnapping Robert Fowler in Niger in 2008. In the terrorism versus 
organized crime debate, Fowler is convinced that the former label applies to 
AQIM. His reasoning is worth quoting in full:
Almost since 9/11, there has been a loud debate among securocrats over whether 
Al Qaeda and its franchises, like AQIM, are bandits, opportunists, thugs, psycho-
paths, and restless, underemployed youths flying a flag of Islamic convenience, 
or, conversely, deeply committed religious zealots engaging, Robin Hood-like, in 
banditry, kidnapping and trafficking to finance the achievement of their Islamic 
vision. Many, probably most, have opted for some variation of the convenient first 
option, and many security services still favour this interpretation, mostly, I suspect, 
because it makes these movements easy to belittle and should make them much 
easier to defeat. Whatever the reasoning, based on my experience, I know it to 
be the wrong answer.82
The whole of Fowler’s book supports the analysis that AQIM’s particular funda-
mentalist take on Islam affected everything to do with the kidnapping and its 
resolution. Belmokhtar is described as a revered leader with a palpably com-
manding presence, principled in the radical interpretation of his faith, but who 
ensured that his hostages were not mistreated or tortured during their captivity. 
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Fowler notes how he and his fellow hostage were continually hounded by many 
zealous members of the katiba ‘to become slaves of Allah’, but that they tena-
ciously managed to resist converting to Islam. Belmokhtar finally put the issue to 
rest by saying that a conversion could not be imposed and had to be voluntary.83
governments invariably offer carefully formulated denials that they pay ran-
soms, but money is frequently paid through or by others. When confronted 
by the otherwise imminent death of one of their nationals, countries are less 
principled when it comes to the policy of offering no ransoms or significant 
concessions. The stance of Algeria, the united Kingdom, and the united States 
to under no circumstances pay ransoms is a wise one, and has been agreed as 
desirable state practice in the global Counter Terrorism Forum (gCTF). It also 
figured in a separate declaration of the June 2013 g8 in Lough erne. Here the 
agreement to ‘unequivocally reject the payment of ransoms to terrorists’ did 
not last beyond October when France paid more than €20 million to secure the 
release of the four hostages taken at Arlit, Niger.84 For the Sahel hostages, France, 
Switzerland, and Spain have paid the largest share of the ransoms, and their 
nationals are not coincidentally kidnapped most frequently. Nonetheless, Fowler 
rebukes the Anglo-Saxon allies that criticized Canada for paying the ransom that 
secured his release, presenting several lesser known cases of hypocrisy in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.85 If states and companies do manage to resist the temptation 
to pay large ransoms to secure the release of their nationals, this will impact 
enormously on AQIM’s ability to finance its operations. It would also end the 
trend of continuing hostage takings in the Sahel.
The available evidence does not support the analysis that AQIM’s jihadist 
rhetoric is merely the façade of a criminal organization that has self-enrich-
ment as its primary objective. Just as Belmokhtar’s reputation as a cigarette 
smuggler is hard to reconcile with local evidence, AQIM’s role in the drugs trade 
seems equally marginal. This stands in stark contrast to the large role that the 
corrupt Malian government has played in allowing the drug trade to flourish, 
for instance by facilitating passage and obstructing law-enforcement efforts. 
This would imply that the counterterrorism strategy of cutting AQIM’s drug 
revenue misses the point and could prove counterproductive. The drug trade 
probably has a bigger negative influence on Malian society than terrorism, and 
the international community should avoid approaching the problem through 
the prism of counterterrorism, where the state is both a victim and a partner 
in the fight. Only through fighting corruption and fundamentally reforming 
government institutions and practices can the problem of drugs be addressed.
Conclusion
Despite experiencing serious setbacks over the past decade, AQIM has shown 
remarkable continuity and resilience. The jihadist galaxy in Mali and the broader 
Sahel may at first glance appear to be fractured, but personal connections and 
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a shared history grant AQIM considerable influence over other Salafi–jihadist 
groups. AQIM’s current commanding cadre, the ‘old guard’ harking back to the 
Algerian gIA and gSPC, is fiercely loyal to Al Qaeda’s Al-Zawahiri, and will not 
be seduced by IS. The reintegration of Belmokhtar into AQIM’s ranks will sig-
nificantly increase operational capacity, and the recent hotel attacks indicate a 
potential new and deadly tactic targeting civilians and Western interests.
In distinguishing between a strategy of terrorism and one of insurgency, 
Duyvesteyn and Fumerton’s framework offers useful categories to compare the 
characteristics of each. First, AQIM’s objectives and ideology are closely aligned 
with Al Qaeda, and strongly indicate a strategy of terrorism rather than insur-
gency. The Caliphate is not an immediate goal, and by targeting the ‘far enemy’ 
AQIM aims at provoking Western reactions. Secondly, AQIM’s organization dis-
plays all the elements of a typical terrorist one: small, mobile, and clandestine 
units rather than a large shadow organization. When the opportunity unexpect-
edly arose to govern northern Mali as an ‘Islamic state’ in 2012, AQIM and its 
partners were unprepared. Despite warnings by the strategic leadership, local 
commanders made all the mistakes they were instructed to avoid. Thirdly, as a 
result of their Sahelistan project, AQIM changed its relationship with the local 
population from acceptance of customs and loose integration into the local fab-
ric, to a position of governance and responsibility. ultimately, they alienated the 
locals, and Operation Serval removed them from power. AQIM has since recov-
ered and reverted to its traditional and effective modus operandi: ambushes, 
lightning raids, and attacks across the Sahel. In the region of Timbuktu, however, 
it seems that AQIM is again seeking to control the population. This is more 
indicative of a strategy of insurgency and illustrates the limits of trying to fit 
AQIM’s modus operandi into a conceptual framework. After all, AQIM’s different 
commanders display strong autonomous traits, impeding management by their 
strategic leadership and academic conceptualization alike.
Finally, the evidence does not support the accusation that AQIM is a criminal 
organization with a religious façade. Within the drug trade, AQIM plays but a 
small role if any at all, while government corruption and complicity are primarily 
responsible for the flourishing narcotics trade. AQIM’s main source of income 
remains ransoms, and as long as these are paid new hostages will be kidnapped. 
As for the label insurgent or terrorist, there is no controversy in concluding that 
AQIM is extremely adept at using terrorist tactics, and that their intent and 
capacity to do so is unlikely to diminish in the near future.
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